AI agents are becoming a practical part of enterprise work. Teams use them to research information, assist developers, and complete tasks across applications. As agents gain access to Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, the critical question changes from “Who can open the AI application?” to “What can the agent do once it is connected?”
Citadel Identity360 gives organizations a way to answer that question. Teams can register MCP servers, create agents with accountable owners, authorize the specific tools each agent needs, and generate a configuration file that agents in Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor can use to access those governed MCPs.
This extends identity governance to the point where an AI agent meets enterprise tools and data.
One governance model across AI platforms
Without a common governance model, teams can configure agents separately in each AI platform. Tool access may be granted broadly, ownership may be unclear, and configuration details can be difficult to review as projects evolve.
Citadel Identity360 puts the governance decision in one place. The organization defines the agent, its owner, its approved MCP servers, and the tools it is allowed to use. Citadel then generates the configuration that enables the agent to connect from its AI platform.
Whether a team works in Claude, OpenAI, or Cursor, the governing question remains the same: Is this agent authorized to use this tool for its approved purpose?
Citadel’s agent-governance model is built around agent ownership, MCP registration, tool-level authorization, and controlled access for the people who use agents.
Register MCP servers and establish ownership
An MCP server can expose valuable enterprise capabilities: searching documents, querying business systems, retrieving project information, or updating records. Before agents connect to it, the organization needs to know who owns the server and which capabilities it makes available.
Citadel Identity360 lets teams register MCP servers within a governed inventory. Agents are created with ownership recorded at registration and can be connected to one or more approved MCP servers. Citadel agent governance
This creates accountability from the start. When an agent’s purpose changes, its owner moves teams, or a server exposes new tools, there is a clear record to revisit.
Grant access at the tool level
Connection to an MCP server should not mean permission to use every tool it offers.
A knowledge server, for example, might expose both a search tool and a tool that changes documents. An agent built to answer research questions may need search access but not editing rights.
Citadel Identity360 maps agents to the specific tool sets they need from each MCP server. Authorization is defined at the tool level, allowing organizations to limit an agent’s capabilities to its approved task. Citadel agent governance
That is least privilege adapted for AI agents: limit not only the systems an agent can reach, but also the actions it can take within them.
Generate a configuration without distributing secrets
Once the agent’s MCP access is defined, Citadel generates a configuration file for use in the AI platform. The configuration allows agents in Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor to connect to their approved MCPs without distributing tokens, keys, or secrets in the file.
People sign in using their organizational identity. Citadel’s OAuth layer controls who can use the agent, while an additional allowlist can narrow access to selected members of the organization. Citadel agent governance
This separates three decisions that should never be confused:
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Who owns the agent?
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Which MCP tools may the agent use?
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Which people may use the agent?
An agent can be carefully limited to approved tools while still being available only to the employees who need it.
What this looks like in practice
Imagine a research agent used by an investment or strategy team. It needs to search an internal knowledge base and read project information, but it should not change records.
The team registers the Knowledge MCP and Projects MCP in Citadel. It creates the research agent, assigns an owner, and authorizes only the search and read tools needed for the task. Citadel generates the configuration for the team to use with its chosen AI platform.
An approved employee signs in with their organizational identity and uses the agent. The agent can call its authorized tools; tools outside its approved set remain unavailable.
If the team later wants the agent to update project records, that is a new access decision—not an automatic consequence of connecting the Projects MCP.
Keep agent authority reviewable
AI-agent access can change faster than traditional application access. A new tool, an additional MCP server, a change in ownership, or a move from read-only assistance to autonomous action can alter the agent’s risk.
Citadel Identity360’s wider IGA capabilities—including access governance, reviews, risk-aware controls, lifecycle management, and audit evidence—provide a framework for keeping those decisions accountable over time. Citadel Identity360 product overview
A meaningful review asks more than whether the agent still exists. It asks:
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Does the agent still serve an approved business purpose?
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Is its owner current?
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Are its connected MCP servers still appropriate?
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Does it still need every authorized tool?
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Who can use it?
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Has its level of autonomy changed?
High-risk agents also need an emergency stop path. Citadel’s agent-governance approach includes containment so organizations can respond when an agent’s authority must be suspended immediately. Astranova’s guidance on governing AI agents
Enable AI adoption without losing control
The goal of AI governance is not to slow every new use case. It is to make the approved path clear and repeatable.
Citadel Identity360 enables teams to move from ad hoc agent configuration to a governed process:
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Register the MCP servers.
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Create the agent and assign its owner.
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Authorize the specific tools required.
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Control which people may use the agent.
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Generate the configuration for Claude, OpenAI, or Cursor.
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Review and adjust the agent’s authority as its purpose changes.
The result is a practical answer to the central AI-access question: who can use each agent, what can it do, and who is accountable for it?
As enterprises expand their use of AI agents, those answers become essential. Citadel Identity360 brings ownership, tool-level authorization, controlled distribution, access reviews, and lifecycle governance together—so organizations can put agents to work while retaining control over their authority.
Explore Citadel Identity360’s AI agent and MCP governance capabilities.
Frequently asked questions
How does Citadel Identity360 work with agents in Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor?
Citadel generates a configuration file that agents in these platforms can use to access MCP servers registered and governed in Citadel. The agent receives access to its authorized tool sets.
Does an agent get access to every tool on an MCP server?
No. Citadel defines authorization at the tool level, so an agent can be permitted to use only the tools required for its approved task.
How does Citadel control who can use an agent?
An OAuth layer restricts use to people signing in with their organizational identity. An additional allowlist can limit access to selected organization members.
Does the generated configuration contain API keys or tokens?
Citadel’s agent-governance approach provides configuration without handing users tokens, keys, or secrets.
Why do AI agents need access reviews?
An agent’s capabilities can change when new MCP servers or tools are added, its owner changes, or its workflow becomes more autonomous. Reviews help ensure its authority remains aligned with its approved purpose.